Blockchain Post-Quantum Readiness in Canberra: Answering ASD’s Vendor Questions
post quantum cryptography

Blockchain Post-Quantum Readiness in Canberra: Answering ASD’s Vendor Questions

How blockchain platforms can answer ASD’s post-quantum vendor questions, and why the ML-DSA parameter set matters to Canberra government buyers.

Roohan Adeel

In July 2026, the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) released a list of post-quantum questions for buyers to put to their vendors. It is written for cyber security leads, vendor managers, and procurement teams. These questions are a practical test of blockchain post-quantum readiness for a blockchain platform selling to a Canberra agency, or to a contractor that serves one. 

It is a different test from the one many Web3 teams are prepared for. A vendor that says “we use NIST-standard algorithms” has answered part of one question. Other concerns include parameter sets, which accounts are still classical, and whether the code is production-ready.

Why NIST Doesn’t Settle Government Blockchain Cyber Compliance

NIST published FIPS 203, 204, and 205, and defined the algorithms. Commonwealth entities are bound directly by the PSPF and the ISM, and a supplier meets those rules through contract and procurement terms (SoftwareSeni summary). Territory governments, regulated industries and private buyers are bound through their own policies or contracts. That’s why you should check which rule set applies to your sale.

The ISM decides which algorithms and parameter sets count as approved. Summaries of its September 2026 edition report that it approves ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87, prefers the two larger sets, and will not approve ML-KEM-768 or ML-DSA-65 beyond 2030 (Cybercorp, Venture Insights). ML-DSA-44 and ML-KEM-512 are left out. The wording moves fast, so confirm it in the ISM's guidelines for cryptography before relying on it.

The timeline is firmer. ASD recommends ceasing traditional asymmetric cryptography, naming RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, and ECDSA, by the end of 2030. It asks for a refined transition plan by the end of 2026 and a transition under way by the end of 2028.

Post-Quantum Vendor Questions, Applied to a Blockchain

The ASD post-quantum vendor questions follow five phases: locate, assess, triage, implement, communicate. Six of them matter most for a chain. The full list is longer.

ASD asks

A blockchain vendor should be able to show

Which post-quantum cryptography algorithms will you support, and when will support be generally available to customers?

Named algorithms and parameter sets for account signatures, validator signatures, and node connections.

Which customer data flows rely on traditional asymmetric cryptography?

Which transaction and account types still sign with ECDSA or P-256, and how a user moves off them.

Do you support post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) hybrid modes as a temporary transition mechanism, and how and when will you transition to PQC-only?

Whether hybrid exists for signatures and key exchange, and the plan for PQC-only.

Is your PQC implementation production-ready and available for customer use?

Network stage and audit status.

How do you validate and maintain cryptographic libraries?

Library names, pinned versions, and who reviewed them.

Do you distinguish between signing, encryption, and authentication risks?

Which parts a quantum attacker can reach. For signatures and key exchange, it's a yes; however, for hashes and AES-256, it’s a big no.

FIPS 204: Three Parameter Sets

FIPS 204 defines the ML-DSA signature scheme in three parameter sets: 44, 65, and 87. A higher number means a higher security category and larger keys and signatures. ML-DSA-44 uses a 1,312-byte public key and a 2,420-byte signature. ML-DSA-87 uses 2,592 and 4,627 bytes (FIPS 204).

On a chain, a signature has to be paid in bytes. A larger set means more bytes each time. If the ISM list reported above is right, the set a platform ships also decides whether an ISM-bound buyer can accept it at all. ML-DSA-65 is reported as approved only until 2030, which leaves ML-DSA-87 as the set with a longer runway.

What ARMchain Can Answer Today, and What It Can’t Yet

ARMchain is an EVM-compatible Layer 1. Accounts and validators sign with ML-DSA-44, nodes connect over ML-KEM-768, and smart accounts can use SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) or a hybrid of ECDSA and ML-DSA that needs both signatures. The whitepaper names its libraries, CIRCL in the node and noble-post-quantum in the SDK, both pinned to reviewed versions.

The gaps are in the same document:

  • ML-DSA-44 is the only ML-DSA set it describes, and it is not on the ISM list above. The design lets accounts and precompiles change schemes without a redesign, but ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 are not listed.
  • Node transport uses ML-KEM-768 alone, which the ISM is reported to approve only until 2030. A hybrid X25519 and ML-KEM-768 exchange is planned before mainnet.
  • Accounts on standard Ethereum transaction types are "exactly as exposed as on Ethereum." Passkey accounts use P-256, and the first guardian design signs with secp256k1. All three are classical.
  • The network is on a devnet, with a public testnet targeted for 15 November 2026. Throughput and finality have not been measured, and no external security audit has been done.
  • The whitepaper makes no claim of ISM alignment or an IRAP assessment.

This post is not a claim that ARMchain meets ISM requirements. It tells about algorithm, hybrid, and maturity questions with specifics, and where an ISM-bound buyer would find a gap.

Before a Canberra Procurement Conversation

List every place your stack uses public-key cryptography. For example, accounts, validators, node connections, wallets, and any bridge or oracle that signs. Write a dated answer to each of ASD's questions above. A vague roadmap reads as a gap. Check your parameter sets against the current ISM, and note which ones lose approval after 2030. Give users on classical accounts a way to move to a post-quantum or hybrid one, and keep a count of how many accounts still use the old type.

FAQs

Do ASD's vendor questions apply to blockchain platforms?

ASD wrote them as vendor-neutral questions for procurement, contract renewals and vendor assurance. They are not tied to one product type, so a blockchain platform selling into government should expect to answer them, parameter sets and audit status included.

Is FIPS 204 enough for Australian government use?

Not by itself. FIPS 204 defines the algorithm and its parameter sets. The ISM decides which sets a Commonwealth buyer can accept and which it prefers. It is recommended to review the complete guidelines for cryptography before making any commitment.

Is ML-DSA-44 approved in Australia?

Reports on the September 2026 ISM edition list ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 as approved and leave out ML-DSA-44. ML-DSA-65 is reported as approved only until 2030. Confirm against the current ISM text, because buyers will check the same list.

Does ASD allow hybrid post-quantum signatures?

ASD does not recommend post-quantum and traditional hybrid schemes but does not prohibit them. Its vendor questions call hybrid a temporary transition mechanism and ask when you will move to PQC-only, so plan that move from the start.

When does ASD want traditional cryptography retired?

By the end of 2030. ASD asks for a refined transition plan by the end of 2026 and for the transition to be underway by the end of 2028. RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDH and ECDSA are the algorithms it names.

Share this article